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6 декабря 2012

Рональд Инглхарт

Выступление на тему «Модернизация – ценности – счастье: Россия и мир» доктора социологии (Ph.D., Университет Чикаго, США), профессора Мичиганского университета (США), научного руководителя Лаборатории сравнительных социальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ Рональда Инглхарта.

организаторы Фонд «Контекст» при поддержке Concept Club

Партнер мероприятия: Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики». Услуги хостинга и дата-центра для хранения контента предоставляет компания Oyster Telecom; сервис-партнеры лекции: НП Papashi, Eclectic TranslationsKITReport«Общепит СПб». Видеосъемка и монтаж – Александр Пушкарев, фото – Андрей Кульгун.

участники мероприятия

В обсуждении приняли участие: Владимир Аврутин, заместитель генерального директора по градостроительной деятельности ООО «Институт территориального развития», член Градостроительного совета Санкт-Петербурга; Надежда Калашникова, директор по развитию строительной компании «Л1»; Александр Карпов, кандидат биологических наук, директор Центра экспертиз ЭКОМ, эксперт Комиссии по городскому хозяйству, градостроительству и земельным вопросам Законодательного собрания Санкт-Петербурга; Нина Одинг, кандидат экономических наук, руководитель Исследовательского отдела Международного центра социально- экономических исследований «Леонтьевский центр»; Лев Савулькин, кандидат географических наук, старший научный сотрудник Исследовательского отдела Международного центра социально-экономических исследований «Леонтьевский центр»; Григорий Тульчинский, доктор философских наук, профессор Санкт-Петербургского филиала НИУ ВШЭ, профессор Факультета свободных искусств и наук СПбГУ; Леонид Ханик, генеральный директор компании Concept Club, член Попечительского совета Фонда «Контекст»; Борис Юшенков, консультант НП «Гильдии управляющих и девелоперов».

видеозапись выступления (с переводом на русский)

текст выступления

Ronald Inglehart: Thank you very much. I am pleased to be here. I gather that this is your last meeting of the year, and it is certainly my last meeting of the year, because tomorrow I am going to Taiwan. I have been here since 1 August, and it has been very interesting, and it was much, much brighter in August than it is now!
 
It has been a real pleasure to meet some Russians and get to know a little bit about Russia from the inside. This is the second year I have been here; I spent the autumn term here last year, and I am just winding up the term here this year, and it has been a chance to get a first-hand feel for Russia, though I have to admit that I have not learned much Russian.
 
What I would like to talk about tonight is findings from the World Value Survey. This is a project in which we have been studying changing values in countries around the world, including Russia – 89 countries containing 90% of the world’s population.
 
The reason we are doing this – and have been doing it since 1981 – is because a very important part of reality is changing. It is an invisible part of reality. We all know the economic ups and downs that Russia has experienced in the last 20 years; we know huge buildings are being built, there is a lot of progress, and computers are developing. Some kinds of change are obvious. But this is an aspect of change that is not visible: it is changes in people’s values and motivations.
 
These changes are measured in surveys that we conduct – representative national surveys in many countries – and we have been doing them starting with a notion that may be familiar to Russians: the notion of modernization, in which, of course, Karl Marx was the most influential theorist. Obviously I do not endorse his whole package; practically all of his predictions were off-target. Nevertheless, one important part of the modernization theory, including Marx’s version and many other versions, is that economic and technological development bring important changes. I think this part of modernization theory is valid, and we have been gathering data for over 30 years now from many countries, which indicates that one basic concept is very clearly true: that is, the difference between being poor to the point of starvation or being prosperous and taking survival for granted is huge, and it is so big that it transforms people’s motivations, their perceptions, their values, and their norms.
 
This interpretation of how change is taking place can be tied to an evolutionary theory. The basic notion is that humans have evolved to survive and this is almost a truism: they survive where they do not reproduce. Also, humans have evolved to give top priority to whatever survival needs are in short supply. Throughout most of history, food has been in short supply for most people. Since about World War II, a new phase of history has opened, in which a growing share of the world’s population grows up taking survival for granted. As long as survival is uncertain, it takes top priority: people’s efforts are mainly focused on getting enough food or enough water or whatever is in short supply, but when they are in adequate supply, people emphasize other goals, and there are a lot of other goals that are important to people besides economic goals.
 
 
So, there is a fairly coherent pattern in which people’s motivations and values evolve. Under conditions of near starvation, they are quite predictable: it is about getting enough to eat, and the struggle for survival is a largely dominant aspect of what is going on. When people grow up taking survival for granted, there are a whole lot of other goals that take increasing priority, and we were exploring what these are, and I will go into some of the details about new kinds of motivation and new world views that are emerging in a rather coherent, roughly predictable way.
 
Throughout most of history, as this slide says, most humans have lived at the edge of starvation. This has been the vast majority of history. The population rose to meet the food supply, kept constant by starvation, disease and war. After World War II, a new phase happened in which many western countries experienced strong economic growth – the economic miracles of Germany, Japan, Italy, etcetera, and the emergence of the welfare state. This combination of circumstances, plus the long peace (the end of war), which now has gone on for decades between major powers, meant that a large part of the world’s population grew up taking survival for granted. So, during the past 30 years, the world as a whole has experienced the highest economic growth rate ever attained in history. This is a very important point, and I repeat it even though the slide tells you that, because it is part of the story. And we have experienced a long period of peace, in which there has been no war between major powers. Again, by far the longest period in history. Already, in 1986, this was the longest period without war between major powers. 1986 was quite a while back; it is by far the longest period of peace.
 
A growing share of the world’s population – first just in Western Europe, North America, Australia, etcetera, but now in more and more of the world – is growing up taking survival for granted, and this is transforming their motivations and behaviour.
 
So, the theory that I have been working on for some time, called Evolutionary Modernization Theory, holds that economic development brings increased economic and physical security, and reduces vulnerability to disease. Public health is better, medical care is better, and people live a lot longer: life expectancy in the US, for example, has doubled since the start of the twentieth century. This is conducive to big cultural changes. When people grow up under conditions of security and take survival for granted, it leads, in a very general way, to greater cultural openness, less hierarchical societies, less authoritarian societies, and ultimately, in a probabilistic way, it leads to more democratic institutions.
 
We do not have lots of data, but in literally hundreds of surveys in nearly 100 countries in repeated waves, we find a pattern in which the onus points to the fact that growing existential security leads to changing values, and they are changing across the board, because survival is so central that when it is insecure, it dominates your whole life. When it is secure, it opens up a whole range of different choices, and, broadly speaking, these changes lead to growing tolerance of gays, gender equality, more participation, and in the long run, it makes democracy more probable.
 
The point I emphasize most heavily is existential security, but it is not the whole story. These changing values interact with rising education and information: part of the characteristics of the modern society is a movement towards increased emphasis from agrarian to industrial to knowledge societies, and in knowledge societies, you get highly educated publics who are accustomed to thinking for themselves. This is a big changing influence also. We are getting much more educated populations: this is partly the knowledge society and any society that gets to the frontiers of economic development is becoming a knowledge society. This is where the growth is; this is where the innovation is, and it is a very different world, living in a knowledge society.
 
Let us consider the factory, the classic engine of industrial society. It is one in which people are marched more or less to the factories like troops. They do a routine that is taught from the top down; they follow a pattern; they do not think for themselves; in fact, thinking for yourself can spoil the assembly line. It is very top-down and does not encourage thinking for yourself.
 
By contrast, the knowledge society is a very different daily experience. We do not want robots who follow routines; we want people who think for themselves. We want computer programmers or genetic researchers, or people in communications and education who innovate and think for themselves. If Bill Gates had tried to run Microsoft along the lines of a classic factory, it would have been a disaster. He needs people who think for themselves, who make decisions, who innovate. A five-year plan to tell them what to do would have paralyzed the process.
 
 
In addition, information is becoming much, much more abundant and easily accessible. I have had the experience of teaching a seminar where we raised an interesting question and within one minute, some bright student will get on the Internet and amazingly fast he will find the answer, and it is from a good source. He will find the information that I might have spent several days in the library looking for, if I could find it at all.
 
So, we have this combination of a growing sense of security that is changing motivations. This is interacting with people who live in a knowledge society, who are much more articulate, much better informed, much more skilled at communicating, organizing, much more participatory, and this is interacting to produce a very different society that is harder to control from the top down.
 
So here are some of the changes that we find; we have got literally close to 500,000 interviews over the decades since 1981, and we find patterns of clear change. Existential insecurity from hunger or war or disease – any threats to survival – are linked with xenophobia. One of the sad realities of society is that under conditions of extreme scarcity, xenophobia is realistic. If there is one tribe living on a territory that is just sufficient for them to feed themselves, and another tribe comes along, it may literally be us or them. We survive or they survive.
 
Humans have evolved so that one possible reaction is xenophobia, fear of outsiders, hostility. And under conditions of insecurity, demagogues and clever political leaders can actually play on this, fanning fear of outsiders to generate hate, to reject and struggle against them, and to close ranks behind the leaders to create solidarity inside to follow the leaders. For that reason, scarcity and insecurity are linked with rigid adherence to traditional cultural norms. This, again, is part of this safety result: you want strong leaders who tell you what to do and who will save you from the dangerous outsiders, and you want predictable, familiar cultural norms. Whatever you grew up with, whatever the traditional norms of your society are, people adhere to them because they are predictable and reassuring under insecurity.
 
There is an upside possibility, too; humans are not necessarily xenophobic. Under conditions of security, people become more tolerant of outsiders. They accept them, they tolerate them, and there is even a long continuum where, with high levels of security, people actually appreciate diversity. It is interesting; it is stimulating. People go out of their way to visit ethnic restaurants with unfamiliar food; they go out of their way to travel to distant countries where there are interesting, different cultures. So there is a whole range of possibilities.
 
This leads to a converse pattern of reactions. Relatively secure societies show – and this is based on findings from many countries on many continents – that although they may vary in their traditions, by and large there is a fairly consistent pattern that relative security is linked with higher interpersonal trust, tolerance of foreigners and other outside groups, support for gender equality, openness to social change, a diminishing role of religious authority (which tends to be the old, familiar norms of your society) and ultimately, democratic political institutions, because they give the greatest freedom of choice.
 
We have got an accumulation of data from nearly 500, 000 interviews, and if I try and describe all the findings, you would be here for the next week, and since I have a plane to catch tomorrow, I do not think that we will try that. But fortunately, the findings can be boiled down into two basic dimensions that sum up lots and lots of the responses to the questions we asked.
 
To one of these two basic dimensions I have given the label ‘self-expression values’, and we are continually tinkering and updating the way we measure it to improve it. A more recent value is called emancipated values, but basically we have monitored human values in successive waves, in surveys carried out from 1981 to the present. We are literally in the field right now; we completed a national survey in Russia in 2011, and we carried out eight regional surveys in Russia this year – we are just finishing those – and we have covered a lot of the world’s population.
 
This is a map of the countries we have covered so far, and thanks to this mega grant from the Russian Government, we were able to cover Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which we had not covered before, and we have got pretty broad coverage now. As you can see, we have not covered Africa adequately, and, believe me, I would love to; however, it is very difficult to do survey research in Africa because in some countries there is literally no survey research organization. In a couple of countries, we did the first survey ever done, and set up an organization and brought in people to train local individuals on how to do interviews. I would like to get better coverage of Africa, not just because it is a big grey spot on my map, but because it is very interesting. It is one end of the continuum: it is the poorest, least developed part, and we need data from the whole range. But we do have data covering 90% of the world’s population, ranging from very poor countries with USD 300 per capita income, to very rich countries with as much as USD 50,000 per capita income.
 
 
So, on the basis of this, fortunately, as I hinted a little earlier, these values can be boiled down to two basic dimensions. Of course, there are loads of other things that these dimensions do not cover, but let us say a large share of this cross-cultural variation can be summed up in two basic dimensions of how values vary, and thus we can plot the world’s populations on a two-dimensional map. These dimensions reflect the fact that cultural change seems to move in two major phases.
 
Industrialization brings a shift from traditional values to secular, rational values. There is one big dimension of variation: from societies where religion is very important to societies where religion is not at all important. And, I might mention, Russia tends to be one of the ones where it is not so important. But there is another major dimension of variation: post-industrial society, or the knowledge society, brings a shift from survival values to self-expression values.
 
I will just sum up very quickly one of these dimensions: the traditional values versus secular, rational values. These emphasize above all religion; they are societies where religion is very important, but a lot of other things go with this. If religion is very important in a society, that society tends to emphasize teaching a child to obey; a strong sense of national pride; that a main goal is to make your parents proud; that divorce is never justifiable; abortion is never justifiable; stricter limits on foreign goods; more respect for authority. All of these things are part of this traditional values syndrome. And, of course, secular, rational values emphasize the opposite.
 
There is a second one, and this other dimension is linked with the rise of post-industrial society, and it brings a major shift. So, already, the Marxist notion that you get on the train at agrarian society and the end of history is the industrial society is a little too simple. In fact, there was an unforeseen shift in the direction of change, which of course Marx could not have understood: it happened long after his death. But the rise of post-industrial society brings a second major shift in values. So, we have this other dimension of values linked with this post-industrial change, and this emphasizes a quite different set of values. One of the big things is that survival values emphasize economic and physical security over anything else. The top priority is given to safety and to economic security versus other things, non-material goals, including self-expression, free choice. One of the big things linked with this change is changing gender roles. Survival values emphasize that men are the natural leaders, that they are the best political leaders, and that they should have jobs when they are scarce. The male-dominated society is very much linked with survival values.
 
Self-expression values are linked with gender equality. It is a very big transformation. Half of the world’s population is undergoing a very big change, from a very narrow range of choices to almost any choice that is available to males being available to women. The job motivation has also changed: in a survival society, when you ask people what is important in a job, they emphasize a good income or a safe job, as opposed to a sense of accomplishment, working with people you like, doing something interesting. These are very different motivations, and to get top talent, just offering the top income is no longer enough. You have to have something interesting and worth doing, increasingly, to get really good people.
 
Other norms that are different: there is a major change going on right now, quite visibly in US politics. The significant issue is the tolerance of homosexuality. This is something that more or less forever has been taboo, outlawed, and not even spoken of. More and more, this is coming into the open, and in US politics, in this last election, one of the things dividing the Democrats from the Republicans was same-sex marriage. It is something that was unthinkable, literally unthinkable, 30 years ago. Now, in a number of states, and a number of countries, it is becoming legalized – a big change.
 
There are other changes linked with this. One of the interesting things is that self-expression values actually tend to be linked with higher levels of happiness. This is a very important change in which giving people greater freedom of choice is actually linked with higher levels of happiness. Apparently, being free to live your life the way you want is more conducive to happiness.
 
So, there are a number of things: under survival values, environmental protection is not a big priority; with self-expression values, it becomes a bigger priority. All of these are new issues that have become more prominent in recent decades.
 
 
Alright, a very interesting thing is that we can map all the world’s societies on these two dimensions, and they are very much linked with development. So it is very gratifying to see that the countries of the world are not randomly distributed on this cultural map; they are very much clustered according to low-income versus high-income societies, and let me give you a map showing this. On this map, we have this dimension, which is traditional values versus rational, secular values. This is survival values versus self-expression values. And all the world’s high-income countries are relatively high in both dimensions. All the world’s low-income countries are relatively low on both dimensions: no exceptions. And intermediate goes into the intermediate zone. 
 
From the audience: I am sorry, where is Russia?
 
Ronald Inglehart: Russia is here, on the big map. Russia is very secular and oriented to its survival values. Russia has had a tough history. So these values reflect history and the experience of a given country. The pattern suggests that as a country develops and gets richer – and India, China, and many other countries are developing very rapidly – this suggests that their values will change in this direction. They will move from values that are survival oriented and traditional to self-expression and secular rationalism. 
 
From the audience:  Everyone but Russia, right?
 
Ronald Inglehart: Russia is a special case. Yes, I will show you. You are right: Russia is a special case, I am sorry to say. We have got 30 years of time series data, so we can actually see whether this is true. With growing security and prosperity, do values move in this direction? The basic answer is yes, but now we have the case of Russia. Russia is a country that has had – and I do not need to tell you this – a tough history. Life was not good under the Tsars; World War I was not great; the Civil War was devastating; the great purges under Stalin were awful; World War II was a huge disaster. There was a period after World War II under Khrushchev when things were getting better, but then there was stagnation, and finally the collapse of communism, when the GNP per capita went way down. Order broke down, and things got less secure.
 
Thus we find Russia is a special case. Most countries have been moving toward a little more secularization, and quite a lot towards self-expression values. There have been quite big changes over this 30-year period of time. Russia has moved in a retrograde direction, toward more traditional values and a bit more toward survival values. The theory, of course, does not say that every country in the world is magically drawn in this direction. The theory is that if the population grows up under increasing security, then it is drawn in this direction. Russia’s recent history, following the collapse of Communism, was not rising security; it was declining security.
 
Fortunately, since about 2000, Russia has been recovering and regaining prosperity. This has not immediately reversed the value shift, because values tend to change in an inter-generational fashion. They change largely as younger generations replace older generations, so that older Russians are still relatively insecure and have survival values, and, in fact, one of the things we find, contrary to the general expectation of secularization over time, is that religion has been growing more important in Russia.
 
Fortunately, Russia’s prosperity is recovering. It is by no means down to the point it was around 1995. One of the things we see happening is that the younger generation of Russians – those who grew up in the past 15 years or so – are leaning toward greater emphasis on self-expression values, and there seems to be the beginnings of a generational shift in this direction. It is delayed because there is a sort of time lag between formative conditions and this generation, shaped out of these conditions, as the adult population. If prosperity persists in Russia, I would expect Russia to begin to move in this direction, and we already see early signs. I would not say Russia is transformed, but I would say the younger generation of Russians seems to be moving in this direction. A year ago, we saw some indications of this: students were protesting against elections they felt were unfair. I think this is a sort of symptom. It is an early symptom, however.
 
This economic story, the sort of development that produces value changes, is an exciting part of the story, but I would be leaving out half of the picture if I did not also acknowledge that the data make it clear that a society’s values also reflect deep-rooted historical influences such as its religious tradition and colonial history. I was interested from the start in the impact of prosperity and technological change on values, but I discovered that tradition is also very important. Thus we find that the countries that historically are similar have similar values. There is an English-speaking cultural zone with broadly similar values that are scattered from Australia to Western Europe. There is an Orthodox cultural zone, an Islamic cultural zone, an African cultural zone, and Catholic Europe is different than Protestant Europe. There is a Latin American cultural zone reflecting those countries colonized from Spain and Portugal. History leaves a persisting impact.
 
 
So we find two seemingly contrasting things. Economic development produces changes, but historical traditions are surprisingly persistent. So we have what seems to be a paradox. I have been claiming that there are consistent changes: values are changing and moving on this map, but I also, to give you the true story, acknowledge that this change is past-dependent. Where you start out shapes where you wind up. So, we have this paradox of change and continuity. And they seem to continue, but they do not really. If all the countries in the world were moving in this direction at the same rate of speed, their relative positions would remain unchanged. It is not quite that simple, but this is sort of the basic idea. So incidentally, the countries are moving to the point where, in this map, Sweden has actually, in the most recent survey, moved off the map. The map used to end here, and we had to extend the borders to include Sweden, because it really is moving. But its relative position is pretty stable.
 
I will go quickly over this next section. Basically, the findings that we are seeing from the World Values Survey are being replicated. Recent publications from evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, psychologists and neuroscientists have been developing theories of cross-cultural differences that are quite similar and quite compatible with the Evolutionary Modernization Theory that I have been describing. For example, some biologists find that societies that are vulnerable to infectious disease tend to have collectivist attitudes, low levels of support for gender equality, and xenophobia, and they are unlikely to be democratic. Conversely, societies that have been historically not so vulnerable to disease have the opposite effects. And of course, this whole picture emphasizes the role of disease, but it is a factor that is a threat to survival. Historically, it has been a major threat to survival, and today we consider it less of a threat, but its effect is quite similar to economic security. All these traits are similar to those linked with self-expression values.
 
Let me wind up, because I have now reached the 20 minutes that I promised to hold off on, by saying that these changes in values have very important real-world consequences. It is interesting to know what is going on inside people’s heads, but it is more than that. For example, one of the important phenomena in the real world is that societies that emphasize traditional values have much higher fertility rates and birth rates than societies that emphasize secular, rational values. Moreover, societies that emphasize survival values are much more patriarchal and much more likely to emphasize inequality between the sexes than societies that emphasize self-expression values. And here it is not a question of attitudes. The United Nations has developed a gender empowerment measure that shows the extent to which women have positions of authority in business, politics, and academic life, and we find a very strong correlation between how high the society is on this self-expression values dimension and its score on this objective measure of how much equality women actually have.
 
Finally, there are various measures of how democratic a society is. These measures have been set up by several different organizations – Freedom House, Polity – where expert ratings measure how democratic the society is. There is a remarkably strong correlation between how high a society ranks on self-expression values – and this is measured by surveys of people’s attitudes – and the expert ratings of how democratic that society is. It is a correlation that is extremely strong. I will not attempt to go into what is causing what because it is a very complicated story, but the bottom line is that it seems as though these cultural changes have very important real-world consequences, and that as a society moves toward growing emphasis on self-expression values, the probability of it being democratic increases. Virtually all the societies – if you just look over them at this end of the map – are democratic. The societies at this end are less likely to be democratic, and I think this is a causal linkage between culture and institutions.
 
I have used up my time. Thank you for your attention.
 
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видеозапись дискуссии (с переводом на русский)

дискуссия 

Оксана Жиронкина: Мы недавно разговаривали о возможных темах выступлений в лектории известного петербургского философа Александра Секацкого, который здесь неоднократно выступал. Он оценивает активности на Болотной как способ самовыражения, как результат зарождения нового класса иждивенцев – арт-пролетариата. Он объясняет это тем, что инструменты самовыражения стали очень доступными. У каждого есть телефон, на который можно снять видно, сфотографировать, выложить все это в интернет – вот и самовыразился, получил стопятьсот лайков, все замечательно. Продать это сложно, с этим проблемы, потому что авторское право в интернете соблюсти довольно сложно, поэтому он объясняет это как зарождение класса иждивенцев, арт-пролетариата. В этом смысле, мне кажется, это немножко противоречит тому, что говорил профессор Инглхарт, потому что мы в тренде, мы ничуть не отстаем. У меня такое ощущение. Если еще у кого-то есть подобные высказывания или другие вопросы к профессору, пожалуйста, давайте начнем (с профессора Тульчинского).

Григорий Тульчинский: Огромное спасибо за выступление. Я не марксист, но ваша концепция мне симпатична. Я – философ, но взгляд Секацкого мне не очень близок. У меня есть две интуиции – хотелось бы понять, как они вписываются в вашу концепцию. Первая. Если все-таки ключевой фактор – валовый внутренний продукт, экономическое развитие, то как быть с такими обществами, условно говоря, типа, Полинезии, Таити, Вануату, где нет проблемы с едой, нет проблем с водой, очень безопасно и комфортно весь световой день лежать под пальмой и не испытывать проблем – особых витальных забот нет. Свойственны ли таким обществам тенденции к демократии, толерантности, уважению к женщинам и другие факторы, которые вы обозначили. Вторая. В последнее время об этом говорят очень серьезно: европейское и американское общество имеет явную тенденцию к тому, что сейчас получило название в литературе постсекуляризм с обостренным интересом к трансцендентному, не имманентному в этом мире, без относительно конфессиональный. Эти две интуиции соответствуют или не соответствуют вашей большой добротной теории.

Оксана Жиронкина: Давайте, может быть, еще пару вопросов, а потом ответ сразу на все.

Борис Юшенков: Ваш второй вопрос ложится в канву моего внутреннего протеста, который возникает, глядя на все это. Я услышал, что относительное положение стран с течением времени не меняется. Страны такой группы движутся вправо, вверх. Мне кажется, срок наблюдения 30 лет очень мал, потому что, если предположить, что эта картина перманента, неизменна ко времени, что же было 500 лет назад? Мы же помним, что все сильно менялось. Это не может быть инвариантом – они явно относительно друг друга движутся. Вывод может быть такой, что те оси, которые предложены, отвечают сегодняшнему дню, даже пусть они отвечают сегодняшнему дню, но они точно не отвечает в перспективе 50 лет назад или 30 лет вперед. Это к вопросу ухода прогрессивных обществ в буддизм или неважно, во что еще.

Евгений Баки-Бобородов (заместитель генерального директора, компания «Мониторинг»): Я хотел бы поблагодарить за эту лекцию. Одно из достоинств таких обсуждений в том, что, много или мало возникает вопросов для углубленной дискуссии, но то, что говорил профессор Инглхарт, вызывает массу соображений. И очень жалко, что он улетает завтра, потому что, конечно, нужно больше времени, чтобы детально обсудить его теорию. Дело в том, что в свое время усилиями двухсторонней комиссии Римского клуба была сделана попытка построить режиссерский сценарий развития нашего мира. Притом, что в этом участвовали умнейшие люди, крупнейшие специалисты, кончилось неудачей. Даже общие тенденции были указаны некорректно. Что для меня очень важно? Когда вы проводите такого рода исследование, какова методологическая база? Многое из того, что вы высказали, я согласен с коллегами, вызывает серьезные возражения. Мне кажется, что это очищенное от реальности представление. Кроме того, был очень важный момент, который был указан в названии лекции, вопрос о счастье. Готовясь к этой лекции, я специально посмотрел, что по этому поводу написано в философской литературе, что известно из оккультизма, что известно из этики, посмотрел огромное количество индексов, начиная от международного индекса счастья, гендерных вопросов, даже то, что предложил король Бутана, – валовый национальный индекс. Было бы интересно понять цели, которые ставятся в такого рода исследовании, потому что это интегральный показатель, очень важный для того, чтобы понять тренды.

Ronald Inglehart: I could easily answer all these questions! There are a number of very basic questions raised. First, is this a map for all eternity? Absolutely not. No. From my very definition, this is not a map for all eternity, because one axis is linked to industrialization, another axis with the post-industrial society. The post-industrial society is a fairly recent event. In choosing the methodology, we started out with the theory that economic development changes values. This was seen to be very plausible for a number of reasons, and that seems to be supported by the data. We carried out representative national surveys in many different countries over many years and measured basic values. We deliberately set out to measure what we thought were universal values that we recognized everywhere, like religion. The notion of religion seems to be recognized virtually everywhere. In some societies, religion is extremely important. In some of these countries, if you ask how important is religion in their life, as much as 99% say it is very important. In other societies, up here, as little as three or four percent say it is very important. That is a huge difference. So, the position of each society on this map is based on responses that its people give to questions like this about different aspects of life. I would not claim that this is a map for all eternity, and I would be extremely surprised if it were. We do have data from 30 years, and over these 30 years, the relative positions of given countries have been surprisingly stable. One reason for this stability is because the countries in this zone have been moving in this direction – they have been moving particularly toward self-expression values – and countries like Nigeria or Uganda have not been changing much at all. So the result is, we do not find convergence. Actually, the distance between these countries and these countries has gotten bigger over time. In other words, far from living in a global village, the difference between the values of rich societies and poor societies is greater today than it was 30 years ago. So now there is a bigger gap between the values of rich countries and poor countries, so in that sense, the map is actually stretching. And this has important consequences. It means that when an Islamic immigrant from a low-income country moves to Germany or Sweden, he or she is shocked at the values of Sweden or Germany. Thirty or forty years ago, the prevailing values in Sweden would not have seemed so vastly different from those in Egypt. Today, the prevailing values in the Netherlands or Sweden concerning the role of women, gays, divorce, abortion, and various things like this have changed a lot, which means that there is a big difference between prevailing values in low-income societies and high-income societies. So, I do not claim that this is a map that endures forever. I would really be surprised if this map applied forever. For example, China has been experiencing a 10% yearly economic growth rate. I would expect that this would move China at a higher rate of speed than other countries, so it would begin to approach Sweden, not immediately, but in the long run. For now, this is in the very early stages. We find evidence of a generational cleavage beginning to open up in China. But it is at a very early stage. Some of these values of self-expression and this whole configuration are beginning to emerge in China, but it is a slow process, it is inter-generational change. I think in the long run, I would expect China to move across this map. If we go back 500 years in history, my guess is that all the countries of the world were here. I see this map as reflecting industrialization and post-industrialization, so this pattern is quite stable in the last 30 years, but I would really be amazed if 500 years ago this map looked this way. The first question asked about the idyllic life in Vanuatu and Kiribati, and I have to say I have never been there; I do not have any first-hand information. I really must confess total ignorance about Kiribati, but I know a little about primitive societies, hunting and gathering societies, even pre-agrarian societies. There is a sort of a myth of the noble savage that life was peaceful and lovely, but actually, anthropological research indicates they had extremely high murder rates. Some of the recently published research findings indicate that – it varies, of course – some primitive societies were relatively peaceful, some of them extremely violent, and that among men in their 20s, the likelihood of dying by murder was as high as 25%.

Григорий Тульчинский: Я спрашивал о современной ситуации.

Ronald Inglehart: The modern situation is perhaps different. If Kiribati is a paradise, I am glad to hear it. That is very nice. I do not deny the possibility. And I would say furthermore, that the life expectancy in primitive societies was only about 30; life was not really paradise. You died of starvation – there was a good chance of that – or disease, and by the time you were 30 you might be pretty worn out. Nevertheless, I would concede that most pre-agrarian societies are actually egalitarian. They have a kind of primitive communism; they have a sort of democracy – males only, but if you are an adult male, you have a fairly equal voice. So, I have to admit that what I have been saying has been based on what I have read; it is not based on first-hand evidence. I do have empirical evidence for these countries. I do not have empirical evidence for Kiribati or Tuvalu or so on; essentially it is guesswork. So, I would say that anything is possible, but I would be fairly confident in saying that their cultural norms do not look like those of Sweden. Then, there is a very interesting question about happiness, and I never got around to it. That is partly because I am not that experienced at speaking with consecutive interpretation, and I kind of underestimated how long it takes.

Евгений Баки-Бобородов: Пусть для начала даст определение счастья.

Оксана Жиронкина: У нас запрещены споры о терминологии, так что не будем – счастье и счастье. В философии это называется «регресс в бесконечность». Мы все интуитивно понимаем, что такое счастье, и на вопрос, счастливы вы или нет, вы ответите, не выясняя, что это такое.

Борис Юшенков: Все понимают, и каждый – по-своему.

Оксана Жиронкина: Безусловно, но мы же не будем сейчас выяснять, как кто понимает.

Ronald Inglehart: Alright, I will not pretend that we have instructions from God on what happiness is. What we do is ask people simple, straightforward questions about how happy they are, generally speaking. Would you say you are very happy, not very happy, fairly happy or unhappy? Of course, we are not so naïve as to just assume that this measure is the ultimate measure of happiness. We check it: there are various ways we can check. One of the things we check is whether this response correlates with other things like how satisfied you are with your life, how satisfied you are with your marriage, how satisfied you are with your income, and things like that, and it actually correlates quite consistently with things you would expect ought to correlate. Another indication that this is a meaningful question is in how much non-response you get. With some questions, we get a fairly large amount of non-responses. When we ask about happiness, we get very little non-response. Everyone seems to be able to answer that question. The ordinary citizen may not know very much about how safe nuclear power plants are or whether Russia should be admitted to the World Trade Organization, but they do know whether they are happy or not. Then there are some very interesting findings about happiness. One is that happiness is correlated with Gross National Product per capital. This is not exactly amazing; the people of rich countries tend to be happier than the people of poor countries.

Борис Юшенков: Протестую. На Кубе по-моему, самые счастливые люди.

Ronald Inglehart: Would you show me your data from Cuba and North Korea? I would love to see it. Because I have been trying for 20 years to do a survey in Cuba and North Korea, and they will not let us in. I would love to see your data!

Борис Юшенков: А на Ямайке? Самые счастливые люди.

Ronald Inglehart: Jamaica? Actually, you are right. The Caribbean countries in general are happy. This is a very interesting finding. So they are happier than their economic level would predict. But let me show you; I said there was a correlation between development and happiness, but it is an interesting correlation. As you go from very poor countries, subsistence level poverty, to increasingly prosperous countries, there is a very steep increase in happiness. But then as you get up higher it levels off: the curve levels off and additional economic development does very little to increase happiness. It seems that as you escape subsistence level poverty, where your children might die of starvation, having enough to eat makes a great big difference. But when you get to the level of Portugal and above, it does not do much. Above that level, happiness varies, but it is shaped by things other than just economics.

Оксана Жиронкина: Скорее всего, возникают другие факторы, в том числе и коммуникативные стратегии?

Ronald Inglehart: Yes, the factors that we have identified so far are, interestingly, democracy. Freedom is linked with happiness, and it gets increasingly important. As you move toward the richer end of the scale, freedom is more important. In low-income societies, happiness is heavily shaped by financial satisfaction. In rich countries, it is more shaped by freedom. It is also shaped by tolerance. Societies that have high levels of social tolerance are happier societies. Gender equality is also correlated with happiness, and it becomes a significant factor. I suppose, if you are a woman, that is not so amazing, but apparently even the men tend to be a little happier in societies with high gender equality.

Оксана Жиронкина: Можно, я вас остановлю? Понятно, что будет много возражений. Есть масса других факторов. Например, у нас не принято хвастаться и говорить, что я счастлив. Начиная с коммуникативных стратегий, заканчивая чем-то еще. Это все сложно. Я удивлена тем вопросами, которые возникли, потому что мы собираемся, чтобы обсудить, применима ли  теория на практике. И мне хотелось бы повернуть дискуссию в эту сторону. Если ценностная модель «такая», означает ли это, что в этом обществе проще продать «это».

Борис Юшенков: А можно я задам вопрос более общий, практический? Давайте, посмотрим на историю последних 3000 лет.

Оксана Жиронкина: Я чувствую, это очень практический вопрос.

Борис Юшенков: Греки забрались в правый верхний угол, и там очень хорошо себя чувствовали, пока их не прихлопнули римляне. Потом туда забрались римляне, и их накрыли варвары, которые были очень долго в левом нижнем углу. Потом Португалия с Испанией гребли золото галерами в правом верхнем углу – их прихлопнули англичане. Как только какая-то группа стран забирается в правый верхний угол – это признак того, что группа стран из левого угла скоро их поглотит.

Оксана Жиронкина: Какое это имеет отношение к практике?

Борис Юшенков: Что мы сейчас видим: ислам – те ребята, которые сидят в правом верхнем углу, страдают от толерантности. Беда происходит на наших глазах, то есть теория блестяще работает, но немножко не так, как нам хотелось бы.

Надежда Калашникова: У меня вопрос в практической плоскости. Я Секацкого люблю больше, чем Маркса. В вашем глобальном исследовании вы экспериментально доказали, что классик все-таки прав – бытие определяет сознание. И даже Россия с ее особым путем доказывает это. Особый путь объясняется только точкой отправления, потому что у нас было очень много катастроф. У меня вопрос: какую функциональную ценность ваши глобальные исследования имеют на практике. Из этих исследований можно сделать вывод, что, если вкладывать в экономику стран с низким уровнем ценностей, ценности внутри этих обществ будут возрастать. Для того чтобы избежать той глобальной катастрофы, которая может случиться, Щвеция должна помогать Зимбабве. Вы сказали, что это исследование касается не только постиндустриального периода, но и послевоенного, то есть это период мирного времени. Скажите, пожалуйста, имеет ли ваше исследование ценность для предотвращения войны – можно ли сделать такой вывод из вашего исследования или нет?

Оксана Жиронкина: Еще несколько вопросов, чтобы ответить на все сразу.

Владимир Аврутин: У меня один вопрос локальный: что обозначает красная линия?

Ronald Inglehart: Post-communism.

Владимир Аврутин: И второй вопрос более глобальный. Дают ли результаты исследования последних десяти лет ощущение, что последние 10-15 лет в Европе и в Америке пошел обратный процесс – растут голосования, выборы, то есть традиционные ценности. Тот тренд, который показал движение России обратную сторону, не виден ли на более коротком промежутке времени (10-15 лет) в Европе и Америке?

Александр Карпов: Я знаю, что любое насыщенное графическое изображение имеет магическую силу – мы начинаем в него верить. Прежде чем мы окончательно в него поверим, я хотел бы убедиться, что оно не является артефактом метода исследования. Мне известно из собственной практики, если взять много переменных, которые как-то связаны, но вообще представляют собой некий разнородный массив, и запихать их в метод плавных компонент или факторный анализ – многомерные статистические методы с вращением осей, – то всегда можно найти две главные компоненты. Вопрос в том, насколько это отражает реальность? Рассматривали ли вы модель с тремя компонентами? Почему две – почему планка сечения поставлена именно здесь? И в связи с этим у меня возникает второй вопрос о концепции репрезентативности, которую вы упоминали. Что такое репрезентативность в данном исследовании? Я понимаю, что Россия представляет собой конгломерат разных обществ, и это хорошо подтверждается демографической статистикой регионов. У нас есть регионы с совершенно разной структурой семей. Есть те, у которых количество воспроизведения детей на семью ниже планки, а есть по 5-6 детей на семью. Очевидно, что это разные компоненты внутри одной страны. Я, честно говоря, подозреваю, что то же самое происходит в США. Я не знаю демографии, но некоторые исследования, которые мне известны, говорят, что средний американец – это миф, среднего американца не существует. В таких страновых исследованиях неизбежно происходит усреднение данных. Тогда что такое концепция репрезентативности? Может быть, нужно было каждую страну расчленять на внутренние анклавы и брать репрезентативные выборки из каждого анклава с очевидно разными ценностями, а не просто брать репрезентативность по полу, возрасту и чему-то еще. Пожалуй, два больших методических вопроса, а потом у меня будет еще несколько замечаний.

Аркадий Гутников (вице-президент, Санкт-Петербургский институт права имени Принца П.Г.Ольденбургского): Заметна ли в последние десять лет какая-то динамика в некоторых странах, связанная с перемещением больших масс населения, например, притягивает ли Мексика США? Что происходит в Великобритании? Притягивает ли юг Россию в этом смысле. Куда перемещается очень много людей? И второй вопрос совсем простой и не очень научный (вы же выступаете в разных странах): есть ли корреляция между расположением страны на картинке и восприятия вашей презентации большинством академического сообщества? [смех в зале]

Лев Савулькин: Вы доказываете довольно правильно, что растет уровень благосостояния и изменяются принципы. Но часто бывает так: в стране растет благосостояние, изменяются принципы, а потом – бах, катастрофа, и – назад. И получается, что какие-то традиции, идеи, группы не выдерживают изменения принципов, и это ведет к катастрофе. А какие-то, наоборот, проскакивают, и катастрофы не происходит. С чем это связано на ваш взгляд?

Ronald Inglehart: I would say that in three hours I could answer all these questions! I will try to give a quick response to each question. One question is: do these two dimensions reflect reality? Of course, with 300 questions in our surveys, we could come up with 40 dimensions. And my 40-dimensional map would be really fun to look at. It happens that these two dimensions pick up a great deal of the cross-national variation: they are two of the biggest dimensions that come out. But there are lots of additional dimension.

Александр Карпов: Сколько процентов изменчивости они берут?

Ronald Inglehart: These two dimensions explain about 70% of the cross-national dimension. A big shift. But, you know, there are certainly more dimensions, and I think we have quite a lot more to talk about with just these two. These two are important dimensions, and I would say proof that they are important dimensions is that, for example – this is far from random – we find a very strong correlation between economic development and these two dimensions. These two dimensions are not based on economics at all; they are based on people’s values. But we find a very strong linkage between people’s values and how rich the country is. I would not say that this analysis proves that Marx was right; I would say that it proves that Marx was right on one point, which many, many others would agree on: there is a big difference between being starving and rich. The map disagrees with Marx on a number of other points. For example, he had a linear notion of history that was absolute, scientific certainty, deterministic: there is one dimension; you go from agrarian to industrial society and then you reach the end of history. This map indicates that, actually, you go toward industrialization, and then you begin to reach a different phase. Instead of the ranks of the proletariat ever growing and growing and growing, they shrink, and you get a service class and a knowledge society that was totally unforeseen by Marx. So there is a phase of history where the direction of change shifts in a significant way. Furthermore, the findings indicate – I must admit that this was not something I was looking for, but the evidence is overwhelming – that culture, religion, etcetera, shape societies very much: it is not just economic determinism. Nevertheless, I would say that Marx was right on one important point: economic development and technological change do change society’s profile. Then there was a question asked about the possibility of these societies collapsing and being devoured by new societies. I do not really see that happening; it is not happening today. I would say Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are doing pretty well, and probably doing better than most Islamic countries. But I say the theory does not promise anything about whether we will have a glorious rosy future: I cannot promise that we will. I would say that the theory does say that if people grow up under secure conditions, then things change in this direction. There was a question asked about whether these countries should send money to these countries so that they will move in this direction. I would say that sending money probably will not do it. The story of foreign aid is rather depressing. Most of it has not been utilized well. I think it is very important to support the economic development of low-income countries; I think this would be a very good idea. It does not seem to be as simple as just shipping money. And I would say that it actually makes sense to encourage development. I think it is in the interest of the rich countries to facilitate, insofar as they can, the development of low-income countries for a number of reasons. Because we are humans, we should help them. But even if you do not believe that, I think it is going to be a more peaceful world if they become prosperous. And I would say specifically, these cultural changes are linked with the fact that we have had the longest peace in recorded history between major powers. It is not a coincidence. Under conditions of severe scarcity, the only way to survive might be by conquering your neighbours, taking their land, and enslaving or killing them. In history, there are lots of examples of this. As you move away from severe scarcity, you move away from xenophobia, and actually you move into conditions where war is not a paying proposition. Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire launched World War II in the belief that the way to get rich is to conquer neighbouring lands and get their land, that riches are based on agricultural land, and thus build a big empire and you are going to be rich. In an industrial society, and much more in a knowledge society, land is not the source of wealth. Having huge acreage is not how you get rich. Thus, after losing World War II, stripped of their empires and much smaller, Germany and Japan became much richer than ever before. Under today’s conditions, war is not a rational way to get ahead. It is actually not a paying proposition: conquering your neighbour and enslaving is not a good way to get rich. It is, in fact, if you have a high cost, a highly educated, highly equipped labour force – let us say, should Sweden conquer India – it is absolutely crazy! The cost of maintaining – apart from the fact that there are not enough Swedes, and even if there were enough Swedes – the cost of maintaining one Swedish soldier in Iraq, for example, India, greatly exceeds the value of the loot they can get. It costs about USD 75,000 a year to maintain one US soldier in Iraq. If they looted everything in sight, this would not pay for it. So I would say that, basically, one of the upbeat changes – I cannot promise a rosy future, but let us say, if prosperity increases and societies move toward this culture, they become less warlike. I think that the democratic peace reflects a number of things: it reflects the spread of nuclear war, which makes the cost benefit very poor, and it also reflects cultural changes, where people are rational, becoming less willing to conquer other countries. Finally, there is a basic methodological question of whether I should use mean national scores as indicators, because as we know, countries are not homogenous; they vary internally, and Russia varies internally, and the US varies internally, and should we use something other than the nation as a unit of analysis? Actually, we have individual level data, so we can break these down any way we want, and I have broken it down, and we find, for example, that in the US, people who vote Democratic are about here while the Republicans are about here: there is a big difference between the blue states and the red states. We can break it down by education, by age, by any number of things. If we break it down by gender, actually the basic values of males and females in a given country are not that far apart. If we break it down by education, the more educated Americans are about here, the less educated about here. By gender, there is not that much difference: it is a very small gap. So, of course countries vary, and we could break it down any way we want; I would say there are some good arguments for using the nation as a unit of analysis. For one thing, despite all the talk about globalization, the nation is still a very important unit of socialization and shared experience. So, although of course people vary within given nations, the standard deviation is about this big. Some Americans are there, or there, or there, but if you run a standard deviation, most Americans fall within a circle about that size. This reflects the fact that Americans share a common prosperity, common political institutions, common experience, all kinds of things, so knowing that a person is an American does not give you a specific individual’s prediction, but it gives you a pretty strong prediction of where the average American is. I have run analyses using education or age, and age gives you a pretty good spread, actually. You can break it down any way you want, but one reason why it is interesting to use the nation as a unit of analysis is because it makes it possible to examine the linkage between the mean score for values in that country and attributes of a country, such as how democratic it is. When we do that, we find remarkably strong correlations. We find a correlation between the mean national values on this map and objective measures of how democratic the society is of about 0.8, which is a very strong link. Maybe I have talked long enough now.

Оксана Жиронкина: Сейчас мы продолжим. Единственное – о методике, может быть, не стоит говорить, потому что об этом очень сложно говорить устно, ни имея под рукой соответственного описания методов и выкладки. Я думаю, что это все описано в статьях и книжках – их нужно почитать и дальше уже полемизировать по конкретным вопросам. У меня вопрос. Допустим, взаимосвязь между ценностями и экономикой существует, и мы не подвергаем это сомнению. Скорее всего, эта взаимосвязь все-таки не односторонняя. Каким образом модели ценностей влияют на экономику? Они могут ее менять? Каким образом происходит это взаимодействие? И есть ли оно, видно оно или нет – можете ли вы что-то об этом сказать?

Ronald Inglehart: Okay, since you started with that one question, I will try and answer that one question. It seems to be a reciprocal relationship, but you can sort it out because there is a generational lag. Economic development tends to change values, but it does so by mostly shaping the values of the younger generation, and then as they grow up and enter the adult population, the society changes consequently. So you do not find that the country’s values change immediately. Instead, you find a considerable time lag. Thus, the economic miracles of 1950s or so surfaced in the student protests of the ‘60s and ‘70s. It took a while, and the generation that formed under these post-war conditions only began to surface into political relevance when they were students and then, of course, when they were young adults. That is why I think around the ‘60s and ‘70s you got student protests bursting out, because you had a generation with very different values from their earlier generations. And then, of course, changing values influence the economy. I think exactly how they influence it is extremely complicated, but, for example, one clear difference is that there is more emphasis on environmental protection among the younger generations: they are more environmentally aware, and this, one might argue, will slow down economic growth, although it may improve the quality of life. Rich countries tend to have slower economic growth rates than poor countries for several different reasons, one of them being that if you start close to zero, it is fairly easy to import technology and get a big growth rate. But another reason is that the cultural change puts less emphasis on economic growth as the only thing that matters. Increasingly, quality of life concerns become valued, and they are taken into account politically. And actually, this is perfectly rational. When you reach a certain level of development, just getting more economic growth does not raise happiness levels very much. Having more freedom, more social tolerance, gender equality, democracy, all these things have a measurable impact on happiness.

Лев Савулькин: Я повторю вопрос: в одних странах растет благосостояние, меняются ценности, потом – взрыв, и назад – к катастрофе. А какая-то страна проскакивает это, и катастрофа не происходит. Причем это связано не с тем, что стали хуже жить, а хуже стали жить, потому что отбросили ценности – произошло столкновение разных представлений о жизни, они были отброшены назад, и вместе с ценностями уходит благосостояние.

Оксана Жиронкина: Это не вопрос, а просто констатация.

Лев Савулькин: Вопрос: почему в одном случае происходит взрыв и откат, а в другом случае происходит накопление ценностей.

Оксана Жиронкина: Давайте, это отлижем, потому что, я так понимаю, речь шла о последовательном развитии, потому что есть еще 38 измерений, которые сейчас рассмотреть невозможно. Есть еще вопросы, кто не задавал вопросы?

Сергей Басов (заведующий отделом, Российская национальная библиотека): У меня простой вопрос, как к доктору: какие институты, исходя из вашей теории, в России нам надо бы развивать? Куда нам деньги, прежде всего, вкладывать? В духовные институты, в финансовые институты – в какие? Мы сами вложим, но куда?

Оксана Жиронкина: Чтобы что?

Сергей Басов: Мы хотим туда – вверх и вправо (если мы хотим туда).

Оксана Жиронкина: Я думаю, это риторический вопрос.

Сергей Басов: Нет, это не риторический вопрос.

Ronald Inglehart: I think there is an answer to that. This is not God speaking: Russia is not one of the happiest countries in the world, I am sorry to say, and it has had a traumatic experience, and I find it not surprising, knowing what Russia has been through, that their happiness level is not the highest in the world. Sweden and Denmark are very happy countries, and then there is this paradox of Caribbean countries that are surprisingly very happy, and that is interesting and I do not have a clear explanation, but I would say a formula for greater happiness seems to be: develop economically. That is the starting point. I am sorry to say, to sound so Marxist, but that is only the starting point. When you escape poverty, then other things become important. If your goal is to increase the happiness of your people, then it makes sense to move in this direction. Moving toward these values is quite substantially linked with happiness, surprising as it may seem. And I think it is actually not surprising. I think the reason why culture changes to emphasize tolerance, gender equality, solidarity, democracy, and free choice is because these are conducive to human happiness. Humans are happier when they can choose the kind of life they want and live their own life, and freedom seems to be very much linked with happiness. So I would say it does make sense to move in this direction. It is increasing happiness. Measures of subjective wellbeing are linked rather strongly with this. Alright, this is obviously not the word of God, but I would say that if you are interested in happiness, then this is a good way to go. So, where should Russia invest? First of all, you have to have order and prosperity. That is the starting point. It is not the whole story, but I would say that is a starting point which Putin provided. But then, to move further, I think Russia needs to become a knowledge society. Russia has an unbalanced economy, where prosperity is too much dependent on the price of oil. I think a diverse economy is a very smart move. I think that the people at the top recognize this, but they are having a hard time doing it. And then, Russia needs to become a knowledge society. This requires an open society with free communications, free choice, and less repression. So, investing in that requires opening up, and I think that is an important part of the investment.

Татьяна Чернова (советник директора по связям с общественностью, Санкт-Петербургский филиал НИУ ВШЭ): У меня два вопроса. Первый вопрос: был показан противоход России, то есть откат к религиозным ценностям, и вы объяснили это экономическими и природными катаклизмами, если я не ошибаюсь. Это характерно только для России, или катастрофы могут повлиять на ценности другой страны? Например, в Японии недавно было землетрясение, взорвалась атомная станция, стали они верить больше в бога или какие-то высшие силы? И второй: в каком возрасте, по-вашему, формируются ценности, и могут ли они в силу каких-то обстоятельств меняться после этого возраста, когда человек взрослеет, стареет?

Ronald Inglehart: The first question is: do those disasters strike only Russia? No. I did not go into it, but Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, most ex-Communist societies suffered, in varying degrees, a big collapse of morale, economic productivity, even life expectancy: all kinds of things went wrong. I would say a little disaster will not change your culture. A great big disaster – like Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, and Ukraine experienced – will have an impact on your culture. A nuclear power plant malfunction in Japan got huge publicity, but it was not a disaster for the entire Japanese people. Not really. The number of deaths was small and the impact on prosperity was measurable but limited. Compare it with what the Soviet Union experienced, which was not just the collapse of the economy, but it was the collapse of order, of welfare institutions, of a belief system. This was a huge disaster that absolutely dwarfs what happened to Japan, much bigger. And one of the things that happened along with this was happiness levels in Russia, in Belarus, in Bulgaria and the Ukraine, fell very low. I do not have the map here, but let us say that by and large there is a sort of tendency for, as you get richer, you get happier, and it curves off. In 1981 Russia was already below the regression line; it was a bit less happy than its economic level would predict. This collapse of the Soviet Union, the collapse from being the other great power to being just Russia, the collapse of the belief system, the collapse of life expectancy: all these things were linked with a huge decline in happiness, so that by 1990, there had been a big drop, and happiness in Russia had already dropped significantly before the break-up of the Soviet Union, and then after the collapse, it went down in 1995 and 1999 to levels so low they had never before been measured. By 1995 most Russians were describing themselves as unhappy. This is, in terms of research on happiness, unprecedented. You never got most people describing themselves as unhappy. I am glad to say that in more recent surveys, the happiness level of the Russian people has come back. I think restoration of order and prosperity have had a positive effect, so that by the 2000 survey, Russia was moving up instead of down; by the 2005 survey, a little higher; by the most recent survey we did in 2011, Russia was still below the regression line, still a little below where we would expect a country with its economic level to be, but almost back up.

Оксана Жиронкина: Извините, я вас прерву, у нас остается буквально пять минут. У Татьяны был второй вопрос – если можно, буквально в двух словах: в каком возрасте формируются ценности, и могут ли они меняться?

Ronald Inglehart: Okay, I have an answer: we measured this, and for one thing, values change all across your life, a little. But they change much less once you are 21 years old. Mostly, values seem to be fairly stably instilled by the time you are about 20, in your pre-adult years. So, one last point about Russia: this recovery of happiness has not been uniform. The younger generation of Russians has moved up to a point where they are actually fairly happy. Older Russians are still unhappy. I think it is because the younger generation has adapted to this new world; older Russians are living in a world that is very different from what they grew up with, and many of them have never adapted to it.

Оксана Жиронкина: Поскольку остается мало времени, я прошу вопросы уже не задавать, просто высказаться.

Александр Карпов: Это, конечно, замечательная картинка, она вдохновляет на разные размышления, в том числе на оспаривание ключевого тезиса о том, что экономическое развитие является драйвером изменения ценностей. В некоторых ситуациях, как мне кажется, и это определяет стабильность исламского пояса, ценности формируют определенную экономику. Ксенофобия, с моей точки зрения, может быть экономически выгодной, потому что она позволяет какую-то группу определить как нелюдей, недолюдей, псевдолюдей, и делать с ними все что угодно: грабить, обращать в рабство, извлекать прибыль любыми способами. И с этой точки зрения, такой ксенофобский подход отделения себя от чужого очень выгоден. Возвращаясь к этой ситуации, конечно, шведам не выгодно покорять ни Индию, ни исламские страны, но исламским странам выгодно покорять Швецию с экономической точки зрения, поэтому ксенофобия экономически выгодна именно для более бедных, но не для беднейших, а для тех, кто находится в промежуточных стадиях. Она для них экономически целесообразно, и то, что экономически целесообразно, будет поддерживаться. Точно так же, мне кажется, в некоторых ситуациях выгодны ценности выживания. Они позволяют сформировать так называемую мобилизационную экономику, и мобилизационная экономика – это любимое, чем занимается Россия, постсоветские страны: чуть что, если что не так, назначают Шойгу. Мобилизация, агрегирование ресурсов тоже работает на определенные экономически правящие группы, которые концентрируют таким образом капитал в своих руках. В отношении я с опасением отношусь к вашему вопросу, что нужно сделать, чтобы увеличить счастье в России, потому что самое большое, чего мы должны опасаться, – это национальный проект по увеличению счастья в России. После этого страну можно закрывать. С моей точки зрения, концентрация стран на определенных позициях (это гипотеза) может быть связана с тем, что ценности оправдывают определенные экономические уклады.

Григорий Тульчинский: У меня две реплики: одна – в поддержку и, отчасти, в развитие этой модели. Мне кажется, дело не столько в ценностях, а в институциональной среде. Эта диагональ показывает переход от этнической нации к нации гражданской. Без учета институциональной среды ценности не работают, чего-то не хватает. Диагональ от этнической нации к нации гражданской очень четко прослеживается. Это первое – в поддержку, развитие и дополнение. А другое соображение – настораживающее, с которым я ухожу. 30 с лишним лет – очень хороший лаг, но на более длинном периоде времени история показывает, что переход к толерантному чреват. История Римской империи – это раз. А второй момент – выигрывают на длинном промежутке времени те, у кого высокая рождаемость. А здесь есть явный тренд на снижение рождаемости, генетические проблемы и пр. То есть, лет на 35-60 эта модель прекрасна, но за этим начинаются вопросы. И может быть, то, что Европа голосует иначе, что происходят некие свалы обратно – это «облачко» на фоне этой прекрасной теории заставляет думать о более длинных лагах. А так все замечательно.

Александр Карпов: Можно вопрос: а Китай где? Это не этническое государство?

Григорий Тульчинский: Нет. Империи никогда не были этническими государствами.

Александр Карпов: И Япония не этническое государство?

Григорий Тульчинский: На конституции Японии в левом верхнем углу написано: «Утверждаю. Генерал Макартур».

Оксана Жиронкина: Наверное, это следующий шаг – это вопрос: каким образом модели ценностей влияют на экономику и на все остальное.

Григорий Тульчинский: На институциональную среду.

Евгений Баки-Бородов: Я сказал бы так, что в нашей аудитории присутствовал Амартия Сен. Я начну с банальностей. Наука ценна своей предсказательной силой. И это пожелание на будущее, когда речь идет об управлении (обществом, государством), об обозначении рисков, мнимых и явных опасностей, тенденций и т.д. Если бы в результате этих исследований, которые вы провели, которые потребовали столько интеллектуальных и финансовых затрат, можно было в присутствии G7 или G20 дать точные рекомендации, с точки зрения обозначения мнимых и явных рисков, опасностей и тенденций, мне кажется, эта работа обладала еще бы большей ценностью.

Борис Юшенков: Мне интересно, почему Греция и Кипр оказались протестантами?

Оксана Жиронкина: Мы не задаем уже больше вопросов, мы просто комментируем. Я вам возражу. Вам была изложена теория и предложено подумать, каким образом она применима на практике. Мне, например, интересно: мы движемся в сторону такой-то модели ценностей – как мне упаковать мой товар, если продается самовыражение. В этом ключе было бы интересно поговорить. Мы же зациклились на методологии и претензиях к лектору. Многие вопросы были сняты, если бы мы все прочитали какую-то часть работ Рональда Инглхарта до того, как сюда пришли. А сейчас посидели бы и подумали, как это применимо в данной конкретной моей компании, в моем бизнесе или, допустим, более широко.

Татьяна Чернова: Я могу ответить на этот вопрос.

Оксана Жиронкина: не надо – я не задаю вопросов, я комментирую.

Борис Юшенков: Модели, скорее всего, нет.

Оксана Жиронкина: Вот и попробуйте – это домашнее задание. Я так понимаю, что у нас времени нет совсем, поэтому я предоставляю заключительное слово лектору.

Ronald Inglehart: I would simply like to say thank you very much for a very stimulating evening. I think to answer all of these remarks would be another two hours, so I will not try. It has been a very stimulating evening, and I would like to thank my translator for doing a very good job.

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